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Corporate character: modern virtue ethics and the virtuous corporation 
 
Geoff Moore 
 
Abstract 
This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore 2002; 2005) in which 
modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre‟s (1985) related notions of “practice” and 
“institution”, have been explored in the context of business. It first introduces and defines the 
concept of corporate character and seeks to establish why it is important. It then reviews 
MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema and the implications of this at the level of the 
institution in question – the corporation – and argues that the concept of corporate character follows 
from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre‟s schema. The paper contrasts corporate character 
and virtues with the more familiar concepts of corporate culture and values. The constitutive and 
substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate virtues, are then 
drawn out and illustrated with reference to the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, the paper 
acknowledges and counters a specific criticism of this approach. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore, 2002; 2005) in which 
modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre‟s (1985) related notions of “practice” and 
“institution”, have been explored in the context of business. In the first paper it was argued that 
MacIntyre‟s concept of a practice could be applied to business, with the corporation as the 
institution which “houses” the practice, and that this way of conceptualising business and business 
ethics enables a more substantial conceptualisation of the virtuous corporation than has hitherto 
been available. For those who work in business the further implications of this were explored in the 
second paper in which the potential for business-as-practice to be a source of moral development 
led to the notions of craftsmanship and craftsmanship in community. It was argued that craftsmen, 
acting together in community, would not only gain personally in terms of their own narrative quest 
towards their own telos
1
, but would also assist in the humanizing of business. The full humanizing 
of business, however, will take place only if two other parts of this conceptual jig-saw fall into 
place. These are the development at the level of what MacIntyre terms the institution (the 
corporation) of an understanding of what it means to be virtuous – what I shall call “corporate 
character” – and secondly the realisation of this in the managerial role within such corporations.  
 
This paper focuses on the first of these two further parts of the jig-saw (the fourth is intended to be 
the subject of a future paper). First, it introduces and sets out a definition of institutional / corporate 
character and seeks to establish why it is important. In order both to explain and substantiate the 
definition, the paper then reviews MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema and the 
implications of this at the level of the institution – the corporation. It argues that the concept of 
corporate character follows from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre‟s schema. The paper 
then contrasts the concepts thus derived with those of the more familiar concepts of corporate 
culture and values thereby drawing out the distinctiveness of the virtues / character approach. The 
constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate 
virtues, are then discussed and illustrated by reviewing the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, 
the paper acknowledges and seeks to counter Beadle‟s (2002) critique concerning the 
misappropriation of MacIntyre‟s work in capitalist business organisations, concluding that here, and 
perhaps especially, the notion of corporate character is needed. 
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Corporate character: what is it and why is it important? 
 
In human terms there is a tension between two different types of goods which we require in 
pursuing our narrative quest towards our own telos. That is, according to MacIntyre (1985, pp.188-
189), there are “internal” goods, such as those obtainable from loving relationships, playing or 
listening to a piece of music, or from various kinds of intellectual stimulation, which are generally 
derivable from the exercise of the virtues in a search for excellence within the context of a 
particular practice. In the context of business such internal goods might include the enjoyment of 
the exercise of practical skills, the stimulation that the competitive situation affords, pride in 
accomplishment
2
 and the personal dignity that derives from a job well done. By contrast, there are 
“external” goods, such as prestige, status or money, which can be achieved in a variety of 
alternative ways not linked to any particular practice. These we can refer to as “goods of 
effectiveness”, as opposed to internal goods which are “goods of excellence”. That these different 
types of goods (they are both genuinely “goods”) are mutually reinforcing should be evident. As 
MacIntyre puts it: 
 
“It would be a large misconception to suppose that allegiance to goods of the one kind 
necessarily excluded allegiance to goods of the other … Thus the goods of excellence 
cannot be systematically cultivated unless at least some of the goods of effectiveness are 
also pursued. On the other hand it is difficult in most social contexts to pursue the goods of 
effectiveness without cultivating at least to some degree the goods of excellence …” 
(MacIntyre, 1988, p.35) 
 
However, while in the ideal situation these different kinds of goods are mutually reinforcing, it is 
clear from MacIntyre‟s work that internal goods should be privileged over external goods if the 
good life is to be achieved. The danger, to which many of us are prone of course, is that the 
opposite occurs. MacIntyre warns: “We should therefore expect that, if in a particular society the 
pursuit of external goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues [necessary for the 
achievement of internal goods] might suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near total 
effacement, although simulacra might abound” (1985, p.196). 
 
If we translate this approach to corporations, it could well be argued that the fundamental challenge 
that such institutions face is that, in the need to pursue external goods (profit or reputation, for 
example) in order to sustain themselves, the pursuit of these goods, if taken to any kind of extreme, 
can corrupt the practice (the practice of retailing, for example – see Moore, 2002, p.24), at the core 
of the corporation. Such corruption could thereby reduce or eliminate the achievement of the 
internal goods (goods of excellence) and could, potentially at least, “kill” the corporation from the 
inside in the process. MacIntyre‟s contention is that, in the capitalist forms of business organisation 
that have emerged, this is precisely what has occurred. The corporation has, in effect, “won” over 
the practice – its justification is the pursuit of the goods of effectiveness – such that “much modern 
industrial productive and service work is organised so as to exclude the features distinctive of a 
practice” and in such a way that this type of activity is “at once alien and antagonistic to practices” 
(MacIntyre, 1994, p.286). Thus, capitalist business organisations fail to provide the kind of 
conducive environment within which the virtues may flourish and internal goods (goods of 
excellence) may be achieved. 
 
If this is so, the question then becomes what can be done to maintain an appropriate balance 
between the pursuit of internal and external goods in such a way that the corporation is able to 
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preserve the practice at its core by ensuring that it is not eroded by the inordinate pursuit of external 
goods? Such balance, if achieved, would then enable its employees and others (both organisations 
and individuals) with which it engages to exercise the virtues in pursuit of their own goods of 
excellence and their own telos. 
 
The argument of this paper is that the concept of corporate character, together with its constitutive 
and substantive elements, comes to the rescue at precisely this point by illuminating and offering 
practical help with this fundamental tension that threatens to pervert the very purpose of a 
corporation and the activities that go towards the satisfaction of that purpose. A virtuous corporate 
character might, therefore, be defined as follows – a definition that we will need to return to by way 
of explanation and elaboration in the remainder of this paper. A virtuous corporate character is the 
seat of the virtues necessary for a corporation to engage in practices with excellence, focusing on 
those internal goods thereby obtainable, while warding off threats from its own inordinate pursuit 
of external goods and from the corrupting power of other institutions with which it engages. 
 
MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema and the virtuous corporation 
 
Let us begin to see how all of this might make sense by taking a step or two backwards and 
exploring MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema in some detail. Let us take as a starting 
point that MacIntyre‟s concept of a practice (“any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.187)) can be applied to business – to 
all types of business including capitalist corporations for which MacIntyre, as we have already seen, 
reserves his harshest criticism. (As noted above, I will return to and defend this particular 
contention at the end of the paper.) This schema enables the introduction of the concept of virtue 
(and vice) into the corporate and, more generally, the organisational sphere and provides an over-
arching conceptual framework within which so to do. What follows from this is that individuals 
can, by possessing and exercising the virtues within the practice of business (as with any practice in 
which they engage), gain the internal goods available thus enabling them on their narrative quest 
towards their own telos. 
 
However, this initial virtues-practice schema, in which internal goods attainable at the individual 
level are to the fore, needs to be extended by the addition of the institution that houses the practice – 
at which point external goods enter the frame. MacIntyre writes: 
 
“Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external goods. They 
are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of 
power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they do 
otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the practices of which they are 
the bearers. For no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. 
Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of the 
goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that institutions and 
practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity 
of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the 
cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
competitiveness of the institution. In this context the essential feature of the virtues is clear. 
Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting power of institutions.” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.194) 
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Clearly, different institutions, and potentially different institutional forms, will support to different 
extents the practices which they house, and thereby enable the exercise of the virtues and the 
attainment of internal goods to a greater or lesser degree. Indeed, as MacIntyre notes, “practices are 
often distorted by their modes of institutionalisation, when irrelevant considerations relating to 
money, power and status are allowed to invade the practice” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.289). Put the other 
way around, but in effect making the same point, MacIntyre argues that: 
 
“… the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which the virtues 
can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which are the social bearers of 
the practice. The integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at 
least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities; and conversely the corruption 
of institutions is always in part at least an effect of the vices.” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.195) 
 
Thus, an important part of the whole virtues-practice-institution schema is to focus on the level of 
the institution in order to assess what features of the institution will better enable it not to distort the 
practice that it houses - indeed to sustain and foster it
3
. And equally, there is a need to focus on the 
virtues necessary to sustain what we might call such virtuous institutional forms. 
 
In focusing on the level of the institution, MacIntyre himself makes the important point that, “the 
making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of institutions – itself has all 
the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice which stands in a peculiarly close 
relationship to the exercise of the virtues …” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.194, emphasis added). In other 
words, those who have, in one sense, outgrown the practice and now represent the institution that 
houses it, also have the same opportunity to exercise the virtues in the making and sustaining of the 
institution, and thereby have the same opportunity to attain the relevant internal goods enabling 
them on their own narrative quest towards their own telos. The exercise of the virtues is appropriate 
at that level also. This more complex schema may be represented by the diagram below where the 
“P” inside the smaller circle represents the practice of making and sustaining the institution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRACTICE 
 
Concerned with the 
exercise of virtue 
and the 
achievement of 
internal goods 
INSTITUTION 
 
Concerned with the achievement 
of external goods 
 P 
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By way of an elaboration of MacIntyre‟s argument, I wish to suggest that an appropriate way of 
further conceptualising this is to think not just in terms of particular individuals and their exercise 
(or not) of the virtues at the institutional level, as MacIntyre does, but also in terms of institutional 
level virtues (and vices), and hence of institutional character. Just as MacIntyre talks of the concern 
for external goods and the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of the institution, it seems perfectly 
possible, by way of analogy or projection (Goodpaster & Matthews, 1982, p.135), or by way of 
metaphor (Morgan, 1997, pp.4-8 and passim), to speak of the institution as having a virtuous or 
vicious character or, as I will discuss below, a character that is somewhere between these two 
extremes
4
. 
 
This will, of course, require further elaboration below. In order to explore the concept of corporate 
character a little further at this stage, however, it is instructive to contrast character with personal 
identity at the individual level. Personal identity is usually taken to mean the psychological 
connectedness of an individual – that is to say the continuity of intention, memory and emotion 
through time (Hartman, 1996, p.122-123). MacIntyre notes, for example, how emotivism leads to a 
“self with no continuities, save those of the body which is its bearer and of the memory which to the 
best of its ability gathers in the past” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.33) – a terrible indictment of modernity. 
Character, however, while clearly related to personal identity, is to do with moral development and 
the “type” of person one becomes as a result. We talk appropriately of someone doing something 
that is “out of character”, but to say that an act was “out of personality” makes no sense. Character 
is shaped by experience and, over time, develops into something relatively fixed
5
 although, as 
Solomon points out, “character is never fully formed and settled ... [i]t is always vulnerable to 
circumstances and trauma … [p]eople change, and they are malleable” (Solomon, 2003, p.45). This 
leads to an important recognition, to which we will return, that character at the individual level, and 
by extension at the institutional level, is “vulnerable to environment”, although as Solomon notes 
“it is also a bulwark against environment” (ibid., p.46)6. 
 
This leads MacIntyre to bemoan modern corporate organisations where, for executives, character 
“has become more like a mask or a suit of clothing; an agent may have to possess more than one” 
(MacIntyre, 1979, p.125). MacIntyre here is not talking about being required to play different roles 
but about the essential virtue of integrity by which character remains the same across a variety of 
practices irrespective of role. Similarly, Sennett talks of the conditions of time in the new capitalism 
(“no long term”) as creating “a conflict between character and experience, the experience of 
disjointed time threatening the ability of people to form their characters into sustained narratives” 
(Sennett, 1998, p.24). These related aspects – the relative fixity of character and the requirement to 
sustain it over time, and the associated virtues of integrity and constancy – are not only important in 
the context of the individual but will also require further exploration in the context of the 
corporation. 
 
At this point, however, I need also to say something more about the virtues. The virtues are, 
of course, central to the development of character since there is within the concept of virtue 
the notion that it is deeply embedded in the character of the individual such that “virtues are 
dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways ... to act 
virtuously … is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues” (MacIntyre, 
1985, p.149). In addition, and to relate the concept of virtues back to MacIntyre‟s virtues-
practice-institution schema given above, MacIntyre further defines virtues as “… those 
dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal 
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to practices, but which will sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good ...” 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.219) 
 
On the basis of these combined notions of feeling as well as acting and of the pursuit of the good, 
we can, following Aristotle and Aquinas, devise a four-fold categorisation of character (Porter, 
1994). The person of true virtue “is characterised by harmonious unanimity among her feelings, 
judgments and will” such that there is no conflict between the passions and the will. “The actions of 
the continent [self-controlled] person are of a kind that is characteristic of temperance and fortitude, 
and yet the overall pattern of the individual's life, including his responses as well as his actions, 
reveal that he does not truly possess the virtues.” The “incontinent person ... has a correct 
understanding of his true good [but] nonetheless acts contrary to that understanding. Such an 
individual performs the actions of a particular vice, for example of gluttony, without actually being 
a glutton.” “Finally, what characterises the truly vicious individual ... is that he truly believes that 
his inordinate pursuit of the pleasures of the palate, or whatever, is necessary to his ultimate 
happiness” (ibid., pp.114-115, emphases and explanatory notes added). In a manner similar to the 
above, I wish to argue that it is appropriate to extend these descriptions at the individual level to the 
institutional level and so to speak, by way of metaphor, of corporate virtues (and vices) and of 
virtuous, continent, incontinent and vicious corporations. 
 
Character versus culture: virtues versus values 
 
All of this may be very well so far. Given that, as I have attempted to argue, MacIntyre‟s virtues-
practice-institution schema is a helpful way of approaching business ethics, that it has considerable 
explanatory power by illuminating a fundamental tension that threatens to pervert the very purpose 
of a corporation, and that it is a schema that provides both a healthy critique and a way forward for 
capitalist business organisations and for individuals who work in them, it may be argued that the 
schema has done its job. What, it may be asked, is the particular value in exploring this further at 
the institutional level, and specifically what is the value of the concept of corporate character that is 
not already adequately covered by other ways of conceptualising business and business ethics? In 
particular, it may be asked why the concept of corporate culture – a much better known and 
accepted concept, and one that already incorporates ethics through the notion of values – cannot do 
what the concept of corporate character sets out to do. In other words, why a new term and is it, 
really, a new concept
7
? 
 
The concept of corporate culture became widespread through the 1980s but was based on earlier 
work such as that of Pettigrew (1979). This led, for example, to considerations of how founders, 
leaders and managers in organisations could influence culture (Schein, 1983; 1984) and also how 
culture within organisations was rooted in broader national, racial and religious cultures (Schein, 
1983; Hofstede et al., 1990). From an instrumental perspective the concept of culture was attractive 
because it held out the possibility not only of explaining why organisations act and react in certain 
ways but also of then managing the culture so that organisational ends were more likely to be met.  
 
A well-cited definition of organisational culture is given by Schein (1992, p.12): “A pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems”. An 
alternative definition emphasises the importance of the degree to which assumptions are commonly 
held: “Shared values, shared beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding and shared sense 
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making are all different ways of describing culture” (Morgan, 1997, p.138). The cultural web, in 
which this “paradigm” of the organisation‟s culture is reinforced by stories, symbols, rituals and 
routines and is both embedded in and reinforced by the organisation‟s structure, power structure and 
control and reward systems (Johnson, 1992, pp.30-31), is a common way of seeking to audit and to 
influence culture. 
 
A further aspect of culture which will be important to us is whether organisations have a single 
unified culture or whether, particularly in large, complex or geographically widespread 
organisations, it is more realistic to consider sub-cultures or the differing cultures of subgroups 
(Schein, 1992, p.14). This also raises the issue of whether senior management should seek to 
manage organisational culture in order to create, so far as is possible, a unitary culture or whether it 
is more appropriate to accept but perhaps seek to blend existing sub-cultures (see, for example, 
Sinclair, 1993). Martin (1992; 2002) argues that conceptualisations of culture which emphasise only 
the “integration perspective” (the “shared-ness” in the definitions above) in which there is 
organisation-wide consensus, consistency in its manifestations and where ambiguity is excluded, 
over-simplify (Martin, 2002, p.95). What is needed, according to Martin, is a three-perspective 
theory of culture that includes “differentiation” and “fragmentation” perspectives as well as the 
integration perspective. Differentiation allows for sub-cultures within which the integration 
perspective is maintained but which channels ambiguity outside of those sub-cultures. 
Fragmentation is based on a lack of consensus and acknowledges both inconsistency and ambiguity. 
From a managerial perspective, then, culture may be more difficult to manage or change than is 
often considered to be the case. The same issues will clearly arise in relation to corporate character. 
 
Organisational culture, then, is a complex concept, but within it the issue of ethics or values is never 
very far from the surface. This is partly to do with the values of the individuals within the 
organisation, and particularly those of influential individuals, that may determine some of the 
“shared basic assumptions” that then potentially become institutionalised in such a way as to 
influence not only the behaviour of organisation members but also their own values. Sinclair, for 
example, summarises research that has “demonstrated that organisations produce a mindset 
amongst individual members … which encourages people to behave in ways that are not necessarily 
consistent with individual or pre-existing norms, but apparently induced by organisational 
membership”. She also cites research in the area of corporate crime (Clinard, 1983) which 
concluded that, “corporate crime was determined by top managers who pushed subordinates so hard 
that illegal practices were tacitly necessary to survive” (Sinclair, 1993, p.64) – practices that, 
presumably, would have been “out of character” for the individuals involved. Van Maanen & 
Kunda (1989, p.88) make a similar point: “In essence, we regard conscious managerial attempts to 
build, sustain, and elaborate culture in organizations as a relatively subtle yet powerful form of 
organizational control … it is powerful because it seemingly aims at a deeper level of employee 
compliance (i.e., emotional) than other forms of control”. 
 
The classic Milgram and Zimbardo experiments (see Hartman (1996, pp.146-149) but also 
discussed at length in Doris (2002)) point to the social psychological effects of culture. These 
experiments in which, respectively, subjects assisted by administering (fake) electric shocks and a 
mock prisoner / guard scenario led to stereotypical action by both sets of participants, further 
indicate the power of cultures to affect desires and beliefs at a very deep level, as well as to affect 
behaviour. Phillips, similarly, points to concepts such as “groupthink” and “risky shift” as evidence 
that culture influences behaviour, though in his case he argues that these might provide instances of 
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the “psychological impact of organisational life on individuals” such that personal carelessness 
might be explained or excused (Phillips, 1995, p.568). 
 
It is clearly the case that, within organisations, individual values and behaviour are affected, either 
directly by influential individuals, or more indirectly by the incorporation and perhaps the distortion 
of individual values within the organisation‟s culture. From there it is a small step to the idea that, 
“[c]orporate culture is important to business ethics because it is a vehicle for imparting and 
maintaining the moral principles and the values, good and bad, that animate life in the organization” 
(Hartman, 1996, p.150). Similarly, “[t]he moral development of a corporation is determined by the 
organization‟s culture and, in reciprocal fashion, helps define that culture. In essence, it is the 
organization‟s culture that undergoes moral development” (Reidenbach & Robin, 1991, p.273). 
 
However, while this internal emphasis is clear, what is generally apparent in this literature is that 
culture and values are also often directed externally towards corporate success: “Values are the 
bedrock of any corporate culture. As the essence of a company‟s philosophy for achieving success, 
values provide a sense of direction for all employees and guidelines for their day-to-day behaviour” 
(Deal & Kennedy, 1988, p.21, emphasis added). Or again, “These [core value] slogan-like themes 
are only the most visible parts of a complex system that includes a whole range of beliefs about 
how the organization should achieve success” (ibid. p.24, emphasis added). Van Maanen & Kunda, 
in their study of emotional expression in organisations, similarly propose that, “Organizations (and 
segments within organizations) displaying pronounced concern for culture are precisely those 
organizations where member adherence to a set of feeling rules is considered by management 
crucial to the success of the enterprise” (1989, p.56, emphasis added). 
 
Christensen & Overdorf (2000) provide a related definition of these kind of values. They 
acknowledge that corporate values often carry an ethical connotation. They argue, however, for a 
broader meaning in which “an organization‟s values [are] the standards by which employees set 
priorities that enable them to judge whether an order is attractive or unattractive, whether a 
customer is more or less important, whether an idea for a new product is attractive or marginal, and 
so on” (p.69). They identify, in particular, two sets of values, “that tend to evolve in most 
companies in very predictable ways” – “the way the company judges acceptable gross margins” and 
“how big a business opportunity has to be before it can be interesting” (ibid., p.69). Again, the 
focus on external goods and success is clear. 
 
In similar fashion, Collins & Porras in discussing “core ideology” (a combination of core values 
and purpose – Collins & Porras, 1998, p.73) argue that any ideology will do so long as the company 
“has a core ideology – likable or not – that gives guidance and inspiration to people inside that 
company” (ibid. p.68, emphases in original). Examples include: “Innovation; “Though shalt not kill 
a new product idea”” (3M); “Worldwide reliability of services” (American Express); “To “eat, 
breathe and sleep the world of aeronautics”” (Boeing); “Being out front – such as biggest, best, 
most innovative, most profitable” (Citicorp), (ibid., p.68). However, there are also within these 
definitions of values concepts that do fit more naturally with the idea of internal moral values: 
“Absolute integrity” (3M); “Integrity and ethical business” (Boeing); “Honesty and integrity” 
(General Electric); “The company exists “to alleviate pain and disease”” (Johnson & Johnson) 
(ibid., p.68-69). 
 
The main point that emerges from this discussion, therefore, is that within the various notions of 
values / core values / core ideologies and the associated notion of corporate culture there is a 
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conflation of two rather different concepts – and hence not a little confusion. In effect, and drawing 
again on MacIntyre‟s schema, the culture-values combination has had to bear the full weight of 
both internal and external goods, of both practices and institutions. Because of the “intimate” 
relationship between practices and institutions (they form, in MacIntyre‟s words, a “single causal 
order”) and hence the similarly intimate relationship between internal and external goods, it is 
perhaps not at all surprising that, in the absence of any other way of articulating this divide, the 
culture-values combination has had to bear a double meaning. It has been pressed into service to 
cover both types of goods, and both aspects of corporations – and this has been to the dis-service of 
both.  
 
It is my contention, therefore, that separating out the two concepts, whereby the culture-values 
combination is seen as essentially institutionally-oriented and thereby primarily a means to the end 
of external goods, and the character-virtues combination as essentially practice-oriented and thereby 
a means to the end of internal goods, helps to explicate what is actually going on inside the 
corporate form. But this will also mean, of course, that character and culture may very well be in 
tension and particularly so where, in any particular corporation, external goods become dominant. 
The requirement, therefore, of character not just to ward off threats from the corporation‟s own 
inordinate pursuit of external goods, but to encourage a supportive culture that will enable an 
appropriate balance of internal and external goods to be achieved, becomes evident. 
 
It is, however, also important to locate those aspects of corporations that simply reflect the way 
things happen to be done – the “basic assumptions” of corporate life that derive from broader 
national, racial and religious cultures, things like “the constructed environment of the organization, 
its architecture, technology, office layout, manner of dress, visible or audible behavior patterns, and 
public documents such as charters, employee orientation materials, stories” (Schein, 1984, p.3). 
Many of these aspects of corporate life, where they are value-neutral (no one way of doing such 
things is morally better than any other way), would seem to continue to fit comfortably within the 
revised understanding of corporate culture that I have suggested.  
 
Of course, such a separation between the culture-values and the character-virtues combinations is 
never likely to be entirely clear-cut – MacIntyre‟s schema, with the intimate association of practice 
and the institution, does not simply acknowledge this but, as noted above, even draws it to our 
attention. Cultural aspects, moreover, may well be emblematic of character and hence revealing of 
it. A corporation, for example, that has separate canteens for “management” and “workers” may 
betray a flawed character. Some cultural aspects may have apparently limited implications – a 
corporate culture where meetings typically start 10 minutes late may, on the surface, be no better 
than one where meetings start on time, unless this becomes incorporated into a characteristic where 
basic respect for individuals is no longer the norm. But such a separation does help to make explicit 
what is otherwise not simply implicit but actually covert in Schein‟s classification of culture into 
three different levels – basic underlying assumptions, espoused values and artefacts (Schein, 1992, 
pp.16-27).  
 
Virtuous corporate character, then, (to repeat the definition given above, but with perhaps more 
force than before), as distinct from corporate culture (as redefined here), is the seat of the virtues 
necessary for a corporation to engage in practices with excellence, focusing on those internal goods 
thereby obtainable, while warding off threats from its own inordinate pursuit of external goods and 
from the corrupting power of other institutions with which it engages. And if, as I have argued, the 
concepts of character and of virtue can be applied at the level of the corporation, and since the 
 10 
 
 
virtues “are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways” so 
that to act virtuously is to do so “from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues”, then 
clearly corporate character will have a fundamental role to play both in determining the behaviour 
of the corporation and in influencing the behaviour (and potentially even the character) of 
individuals within the corporation
8
. And the separation of character from culture allows us to 
concentrate on the issues that the concept of character forces us to consider: issues of virtue and 
vice and of character development within the corporate form
9
. 
 
The constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character 
 
Although we now have a definition and certain features of the concept of corporate character 
(achieved partly by way of contrast with the concept of corporate culture) we do not, as yet, have a 
clearly formulated notion of what the concept might substantively entail. It is convenient to begin a 
further exploration of the way in which the concept of corporate character might help us to think 
about corporations and about the development of corporate virtue by considering first the very 
opposite of this – corporate and individual vice within corporations. To a limited extent this was 
mentioned above in a discussion of the way in which corporate values influence individuals‟ 
behaviour. However, Koehn‟s examples of misdemeanour in a corporate setting (Koehn, 1998) 
enable a more wide-ranging discussion. At the same time, discussion of Koehn‟s cases will help in 
framing some further features of the virtuous corporation. In passing, this will also allow a 
demonstration of the way in which a MacIntyre-based modern virtue ethics enables a better 
understanding of these four cases than the limitations of the Aristotelian approach which Koehn 
recognises
10
. 
 
Case 1: The weak-willed manager 
 
Koehn describes a situation in which an employee (the case is not managerial as the title implies) 
“discovers that her company is illegally dumping toxic chemicals into the community‟s water 
supply” (ibid. p.501), but chooses not to blow the whistle. This appears to be a straightforward case 
of akrasia – weak-will or incontinence (Porter, 1994, p.114 – see above). In other words, she knows 
what is right but fails to do it. Why? One possible answer, and an Aristotelian one, is because of the 
way that she represents the problem to herself (her “mode of representation”) by failing to think 
through the implications of the environmental effect on her and the community and by giving too 
much weight to her desire to retain her own employment. But, as Koehn points out, reason 
inevitably has a social dimension. So, set within the social dimension of the corporation in which 
she is employed, the employee may be influenced by a corporate premium on being a “team-
player”, or by the co-option by the corporation of a personal virtue such as loyalty. While these may 
well be appropriate influences in some circumstances, it may be that “the wider corporate culture 
sanctions and supports attitudes that lead the employee to use one mode of representation rather 
than another” (ibid. p.504). This could be an example of a corporation that was in part vicious – 
believing that its good consisted mainly in the pursuit of external goods and using its employees as 
means to that end. 
 
If we apply MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema to this case, how might we explain it, 
and how might it help in framing the features of the virtuous corporation? Let us assume that the 
employee is, within the other practices in which she is involved (her family, art classes, lacrosse 
team and so forth), well on the way to the achievement of her true telos through the possession and 
exercise of the virtues thereby gaining the internal goods that such practices afford, and that she has 
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sustained this over a period such that her character is relatively fixed. Let us also assume that she is 
aware (intuitively if not explicitly) that business is a practice and endeavours to view her work there 
as a craft through which not only is there “a good product, but the craftsperson is perfected through 
and in her or his activity” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284). It would then, clearly, be “out of character” for 
her not to act when she discovers the illegal dumping of toxic chemicals. Now lack of courage 
might afflict her in this particular situation, but what would also undoubtedly influence her are both 
the corporation‟s culture and character. If the corporation is too focused on the achievement of 
external goods, and sees team-playing merely as an instrumental means of achieving profit, for 
example, and if this has become internalised in the corporate culture sufficiently to significantly 
influence employees, then it will necessarily create a tension in the employee‟s mind (a “conflict of 
character traits” (Solomon, 2003, p.56)) which may not easily be resolved. Without a strong and 
virtuous corporate character to counteract this, a character that would in itself challenge the 
prevailing culture, she might well choose to ignore the dumping of toxic chemicals. 
 
Another part of MacIntyre‟s work further illuminates this. In his 1999 Annual Lecture to the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy (MacIntyre, 1999), MacIntyre speaks of two moral systems, that of the 
“established social order with its assignment of roles and responsibilities” (within which we may 
include that of employee within a corporation) and by contrast “that developed within those milieus 
in which that assignment has been put to question”, such milieus including “the everyday life of 
certain kinds of family and household, of certain kinds of workplace, of certain kinds of school and 
church, and of a variety of kinds of local community” (ibid. p.318). It is exactly the tension that 
MacIntyre speaks of between these two moral systems that the employee in question may 
experience in a corporation with a weak or vicious character and a strong culture focused on 
external goods. The problem is partly one of “compartmentalisation” in which “each distinct sphere 
of social activity comes to have its own role structure governed by its own specific norms in relative 
independence of other such spheres. Within each sphere those norms dictate which kind of 
consideration are to be treated as relevant to decision-making and which are to be excluded” (ibid. 
p.322). MacIntyre cites the example of power company executives unable to consider a reduction in 
the overall levels of power consumption even though, as parents and concerned citizens in other 
spheres of activity, they might well regard this as desirable. 
 
What, then, does this say about corporate character? Corporations clearly occupy a “distinct sphere 
of social activity” and the problem of compartmentalisation and hence insulation from other spheres 
of activity is perhaps particularly acute in their case. The virtuous corporation would, however, be 
aware of this compartmentalisation and would seek to make it easy for employees, for example, to 
raise questions from outside this sphere of activity. In the particular case in question this might 
mean having systems and processes that enabled employees to raise concerns about the 
environmental consequences of the corporation‟s actions without fear of reprisal. (We should also 
note in passing that this might well be prudential on the corporation‟s part since such a system 
might prevent an employee blowing the whistle if the issue had been misunderstood or might point 
to a particular activity that requires corporate action – such as removing the toxic element and 
disposing of it safely. But, as Koehn points out, the moral and the prudential are not rigidly 
separated by virtue ethics (op.cit., p.498).) 
 
The corporation of virtuous character, then, will in general require systems and processes that 
ensure the corporation is not “compartmentalised” from other institutions in society but sees itself 
as one part of a larger whole. Equally, the corporation of virtuous character will need to possess and 
exercise the corporate virtues of temperance, to withstand the inherent tendency to focus on external 
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goods, and justice in order to weigh its own advantage with that of the wider community. It is also, 
and most notably, the corporate virtue of temperance that will encourage a supportive culture. 
 
Case 2: The virtuous, truthtelling company 
 
The second case Koehn considers is that of Dow Corning. An apparently virtuous corporation, with 
codes of conduct, ethics seminars for employees worldwide and a high reputation, Dow Corning 
became involved in the manufacture and distribution of silicon breast implants. These became 
associated with a number of diseases, particularly connective tissue disease, but the management 
refused to withdraw the product. They cited scientific evidence and appeared courageous in 
defending their position – all good Aristotelian virtues. On the surface, therefore, Dow Corning 
appeared to be acting in character, and that character was a virtuous one. However, although the 
scientific evidence did not, in the end, find any significant causal link between implants and 
connective tissue disease (Angell, 1996, p.197), at the time that the FDA banned silicon breast 
implants in 1992 “there had been no systematic studies of the effects of breast implants” (ibid., 
p.21). Following the ban, “the manufacturers [including Dow Corning] steadfastly maintained that 
the implants were safe, despite the lack of scientific evidence in either direction” (ibid., p.23). 
Koehn, therefore, is surely right in her analysis that all was not well at Dow Corning, but only 
partly right in suggesting that this may have been due to the fact that the management‟s “judgement 
was both skewed and reinforced in its bias by a culture that could not hear women‟s voices, in part 
because that culture had contributed to silencing women by failing to promote any into positions of 
authority” (op.cit., p.506).  
 
Koehn continues, “We need to acknowledge the possibility of systemic biases and examine the ways 
in which existing power structures may prevent us from hearing from people who are adversely 
affected by our judgements. To the extent virtue ethics downplays or ignores power structures and 
systemic biases, it indirectly fosters unethical behaviour” (op.cit., p.506, emphasis in original). It is, 
of course, instructive to note that while Aristotelian virtue ethics may not adequately handle such a 
situation
11
, a MacIntyre-based modern virtue ethics handles it without difficulty. Here is a situation 
in which the institution (the corporation) had failed, at least in this instance, to prevent the 
promotion of external goods over internal goods – Angell records that “what [Dow Corning‟s 
secret] documents did indicate was how little was known, how inadequate the studies had been and 
how relentlessly the company pursued its market goals” (1996, p.60). In addition, Dow Corning had 
allowed existing power structures to dominate so preventing an important viewpoint from being 
heard. This is clearly a failure to encourage excellence in the practice. For, surely, part of being 
excellent in the practice of the application of chemically-based products to human beings in general 
and women in particular, is to ensure that proper scientific evidence is produced in advance and 
then to ensure that the views of potential or actual customers are heard and acted upon, and that to 
do so is likely to require a reasonable representation of such people in managerial positions. The 
virtues-practice-institution schema, far from downplaying or ignoring power structures and 
systemic biases, draws our attention to their likelihood and encourages a solution through the 
exercise of the virtues both by those engaged in the practice and by those who are representative of 
the corporation. This, then, could be an example of a corporation that was in part incontinent – 
normally aware of what its true good was but on occasion acting in a vicious manner, though not by 
character vicious. 
 
From this case, then, further features of the internal focus of the notion of corporate character 
become evident. The corporation of virtuous character will encourage the pursuit of excellence in 
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the practice at its core. To do so it will, as noted above, require the corporate virtue of temperance 
to ward off the inordinate pursuit of external goods and to encourage a supportive culture, together 
with the corporate virtue of prudence (practical wisdom) which might be particularly required in 
situations such as this where the scientific evidence is, in itself, unlikely to be unequivocal, and 
hence judgement is required. In addition, a power-balanced structure that prevents systemic biases 
is required to ensure that the views and desires of particular constituencies are not privileged over 
those of others. This requirement, of course, derives from the cooperative nature of the practice that 
is at the core of the corporation – see MacIntyre‟s definition of a practice given above. 
 
Case 3: The virtuous but thoughtless actor 
 
Koehn‟s third example involves the dumping of aircraft fuel before landing. Pilots regularly 
performed this action over a period of many years, apparently without any thought for the 
environmental consequences, until one pilot finally thought to protest against the practice. Given 
that it would be difficult to attribute any viciousness on the part of the pilots, indeed much in their 
characters would suggest virtue, the problem seems to be located in simple thoughtlessness, 
something which Aristotelian virtue ethics fails to deal with adequately
12
. 
 
However, a MacIntyre-based modern virtue ethics suggests at least part of an explanation that 
Koehn does not explore even within an Aristotelian framework. For the questions that need to be 
asked are, “Why did this become a common practice in the first place?” and, “Why, when concerns 
for the environment were becoming prominent, did the corporations concerned not take action but 
wait for the issue to be drawn to their attention by a pilot?”. Both questions relocate the moral issue 
at the corporate level and ask, in effect, what it was in the corporate characters of the various 
corporations involved that allowed such an act to occur repeatedly. (Note that this is not to deny the 
moral culpability of the individuals as well (see Moore, 1999), but to accept that there may be some 
mitigating circumstances.) 
 
The problem, of course, is partly a type of “compartmentalisation” that we met in Case 1. Here the 
corporations defined acts not so much in economic terms (though there must have been some 
calculation of the cost of fuel dumping), but in terms of health and safety – it was clearly prudent to 
carry some surplus fuel to allow for unforeseen circumstances and it was safer to land with the 
plane lightened by dumping the excess once it was known that it would no longer be needed. That 
reasoning, however, failed to consider the other effects of such dumping – both the economic and 
the environmental – to a sufficient degree. While that partly answers the questions posed to the 
corporation, MacIntyre provides the other part of the answer when he makes the point that one of 
the requirements of the moral agent is “to question the hitherto unquestioned … taking the view that 
responsible deliberation requires that on occasion one puts established standards in question …” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p.313). 
 
A similarity exists here between MacIntyre‟s philosophical perspective and that in organisational 
studies. Edmondson‟s work on team psychological safety, (“a sense of confidence that the team will 
not embarrass, reject, or punish someone for speaking up” (Edmondson, 1999, p.354), points to a 
lack of such safety contributing to “an unwillingness to question the goals of management” (ibid., 
p.375). In both this case and Case 1, then, a lack of team psychological safety may have been a 
contributory factor – and a corporate character that discouraged team psychological safety might 
provide an explanation. 
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A requirement of the virtuous corporation, as much as of the virtuous individual, then, is to enable 
the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned. In the particular case under consideration we could 
have an example of a corporation that is, in part, continent  – one which generally does the right 
thing and yet the overall pattern of the corporation‟s life, including its responses as well as its 
actions, reveal that it does not truly possess the virtues. The corporation of virtuous character, then, 
will require further systems and processes that enable the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned 
and this will inevitably also require the corporate virtue of prudence in order to make right 
judgements when such questions are raised. 
 
Case 4: The good bigot 
 
Koehn‟s final case considers an apparently excellent manager (Speer) with all the virtues that one 
might wish for in the role – but whose job was Hitler‟s Minister for armaments and war production. 
Again, Koehn wonders how Aristotelian virtue ethics could overlook the “larger forces responsible 
for making practical situations appear in a certain light in the first place” (op.cit., p.509), or, in other 
words, how virtue ethics could focus on the virtues Speer demonstrated in perfecting his talents in 
the role while at the same time ignoring the fact that Speer saw the Jews and other workers as 
expendable. (MacIntyre considers a related example in his 1999 lecture, but focuses on a Nazi 
whose role was to schedule trains and who did so irrespective of the cargo.) 
 
Again, MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema suggests an answer by focusing on the 
institution and its potential for corruption. In some circumstances the practice of producing 
armaments for war may be a just one, but among the first concerns for the institution are to consider 
both the purpose for which the institution exists and the manner in which it is intended to conduct 
its “business”. Even if, on the first count, the institution‟s purpose was judged just, the manner in 
which it treated people was clearly unjust and so Speer was guilty not just of personal moral failure 
but of creating an organisation that in his case quite literally incorporated evil
13
. That there were 
wider social and political institutions that legitimised this activity points to the requirement of the 
virtuous organisation to resist the corrupting power of organisations with which it in turn relates. 
For, surely, here is an example of a truly vicious organisation in which, where the virtues were 
employed, they were employed ultimately in the service of vice. 
 
This case, then, indicates the requirement of a just purpose for the particular practice-institution 
combination. In other words, the practice-institution combination must reflect on its own telos, (just 
as much as the individuals who work within it should reflect on theirs), recognising that this is both 
partially known and partially unknown so that a narrative quest is entailed (see MacIntyre, 1985, 
pp.218-219 and Moore, 2005, p.245-247). Such a reflection might have gone some way to 
preventing the kind of activity that Speer‟s Ministry engaged in, although broader social and 
political factors were also clearly influential in this case. In addition, therefore, the corporate virtue 
of fortitude will be particularly required in such circumstances, for it takes courage to stand up 
against influential external individuals and institutions that may themselves encourage far too great 
an emphasis on the achievement of external goods (goods of effectiveness) – as this case rather 
poignantly illustrates. 
 
The character of the virtuous corporation 
 
Having discussed these cases, we are now in a position to draw together the threads of this 
discussion and to formulate a fuller description of the concept of a virtuous corporate character. In 
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the first instance this is done by considering the general concept of corporate character without any 
reference to what a virtuous corporate character might look like. 
 
Corporate character, then, provides an essential internal focus to the corporation and thereby offers 
a solution to the fundamental challenge that such institutions face – the challenge of sustaining the 
practice at its core by maintaining an appropriate balance between internal and external goods. The 
distinction between character (together with the virtues that underpin it and the associated focus on 
internal goods) and culture (and values and their associated focus on external goods) helps not only 
to explicate what is actually going on inside the corporate form, but also in resolving the tension 
that threatens to pervert the very purpose of the corporation. Following this distinction it is 
important to recognise that character grows and develops over time and becomes relatively fixed, so 
that even relatively major changes in culture (brought about, for example, by a change in structure) 
may have little effect on the character of the corporation. However, the effect of the environment on 
individuals‟ characters (discussed above) and the correlative effect of the environment on corporate 
character, combined with the significance of influential individuals within the corporation (see 
below) suggest that corporate character may be rather more malleable than that of individuals. The 
requirement to sustain character over time, through exercising the virtue of constancy, may be 
particularly challenging in the corporate context. 
 
The separation of character from culture also forces consideration of whether character might be 
disaggregated into sub-characters particularly in large, complex or geographically dispersed 
corporations. While this is clearly the case with culture, the relative fixity and unitary form of 
character suggests that it needs to be regarded, and certainly developed, as a single conception. And 
in that context, we should note the importance of particular individuals, including those influential 
people in its recent past, upon whom the responsibility rests for the development of the character of 
the corporation. 
 
What, then, might a virtuous corporate character look like? First, within the MacIntyre-based 
virtues-practice-institution schema the corporation needs to recognise that it is founded on and has 
as its most important function the sustenance of the practice. Second, the character of the virtuous 
corporation should encourage the pursuit of excellence in the practice. Third, the character of the 
virtuous corporation should be such as to focus on the external goods such as profit or reputation 
but only to the extent necessary for the sustenance and development of the practice. This would 
ensure an appropriate location of external goods (which, to repeat, are goods) in the whole scheme 
of things, and guard against the effects of the inherent tendency to avarice particularly in capitalist 
business organisations. Fourth, the character of the virtuous corporation should be such as to resist 
the corrupting power of organisations with which it in turn relates. Although this might, on first 
consideration, be thought of in terms of relatively immediate organisations such as competitors, 
suppliers or those that represent the financial markets, it is clear from the above discussion of Case 
4 that this needs to be extended to include the whole range of business, political and social 
institutions with which the corporation may engage. Such institutions may provide a powerful and 
potentially corrupting context in which the corporation has to operate
14, just as Speer‟s personal 
actions may be mitigated to a limited extent by the social and political institutions with which his 
own Ministry interacted.  
 
There are, however, a number of other features of the virtuous corporate character that are required. 
These are the requirement of a just purpose for the particular practice-institution combination, the 
development of a power-balanced structure that will ensure that the views and desires of particular 
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constituencies are not privileged over those of others, and the implementation of systems and 
processes that counter biases and enable the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned. In particular, 
these will allow the corporation not to see itself as “compartmentalised” from other institutions in 
society but as one part of a larger whole. While to some extent outside of its control, the 
encouragement of a supportive culture (as redefined here) will also be a feature of a virtuous 
corporate character. 
 
Finally, of course, we need to address the corporate virtues that are necessary to enable the 
corporation to focus on the practice and the internal goods thereby obtainable. The cardinal virtues, 
as noted above, provide a good starting point. The virtuous corporation will require fortitude in 
order to resist the corrupting power of institutions with which it relates and to minimise the effects 
of the environment on its character where these might be damaging. It will also require temperance 
to withstand the inherent tendency to avarice that exists particularly within the capitalist corporate 
form, but potentially exists in all modes of institutionalisation of business, and to mitigate the 
temptation to use power to its own advantage. It will require justice in order to weigh its own 
advantage with that of the wider community and it may be the virtue of justice that helps in 
avoiding the compartmentalisation of business from other spheres of activity in society. Prudence 
(practical wisdom) will be required both in order to enable the exercise of the kind of commercial 
acumen that corporations require and to enable the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned that, as 
we have seen, is a necessary feature of the virtuous corporate form. Prudence is, of course, the 
intellectual virtue that completes and unifies the virtues in directing all the actions of the individual 
towards the true human good, and it would be reasonable to expect it to play the same part in 
relation to the corporation, directing it towards its good on its own narrative quest. 
 
In addition to the cardinal virtues, the virtues of integrity and constancy, discussed above, will both 
be required. Integrity, with fortitude, will preserve the corporation from corrupting influences in the 
environment. Integrity, with justice, will help to guard against compartmentalisation. Integrity, with 
prudence, will enable the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned. Constancy will help the 
corporation to preserve its character over time, particularly as the environment, and the significant 
individuals within the corporation, change. 
 
Whether these virtues, or virtue on its own, are sufficient is partly an empirical question. Keeley 
suggests that relying on virtue will never be “enough to overcome problems of complex 
organizations, such as abuse of power by bosses or cynical reactions by workers” (Keeley, 2000, 
p.248). His solution relies upon formal systems of corporate governance in order to build in the 
checks and balances that such complex organisations require. Keeley may well be right, but that in 
no way diminishes the primary need for the development of virtue within the corporate form. 
 
And how might these features of a virtuous corporate character and the corporate virtues be 
developed? I have indicated in various places above that the responsibility for this lies with 
particular individuals within the corporation. In other words, the task of creating the virtuous 
corporation is essentially managerial. And it is the realisation of this in the managerial role within 
corporations that forms the final part of the jig-saw and, as noted above, is planned as the fourth 
paper in this work.  
 
Before concluding, however, there is a particular criticism of this whole approach that requires a 
response. It is to that, that we now turn. 
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The misappropriation of MacIntyre? 
 
The criticism relates to the whole foundation of this work contained in an article by Beadle (2002). 
A full response might require an article in its own right, but the intention here is simply to justify 
the use of MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema in its application to capitalist business 
organisations.  
 
The essence of Beadle‟s critique, at least as it affects the foundations of my work, is as follows. 
First, he argues that MacIntyre‟s use of the notion of practice requires us to understand that “in 
practice-based communities power is subordinated to the excellence of the practices” such that 
“practice-based communities determine resource allocation to practices through a conscious and 
articulate process of collective decision-making …” (Beadle, 2002, p.52), whereas “[i]n managerial 
orders co-operation is subordinated to power” (ibid., p.53). Business, according to Beadle, is in the 
second category. Second, and related to this point, “MacIntyre connects his appeal to a virtue ethics 
with his appeal to resistance against capitalism to argue that one cannot lead a virtuous practice-
based life within an institutional order dominated by power and with the pursuit of goods of 
effectiveness as its justification” (ibid. p.54). Thus, Beadle argues, one has to acknowledge 
MacIntyre‟s approach to political economy rather than simply appropriating MacIntyre within a 
capitalist framework. 
 
It is, of course, true that MacIntyre‟s definition prescribes cooperation as a fundamental aspect of a 
practice: a practice is “any coherent and complex socially established cooperative human activity” 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.187, emphasis added). It is, of course, also true that the examples MacIntyre 
gives of practices incorporate cooperation – he indicates that “the range of practices is wide: arts, 
sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life, all fall 
under the concept” (ibid. p.188), and it is clear that each of these involve cooperative human 
activity.  
 
However, we should note three things. First, as we have already seen, all practices are housed 
within institutions (“no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions” 
(ibid. p.194)), that institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with external goods 
(goods of effectiveness) and that institutions “are structured in terms of power and status” such that 
“the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution” and that without the 
virtues practices “could not resist the corrupting power of institutions” (ibid. p.194). The point is 
that within all practice-institution arrangements (not just capitalist business organisations) there is, 
according to MacIntyre, an intrinsic tension between the practice and the institution and matters of 
cooperation, competition, power, status and wealth are constantly at issue. Hence, even on 
MacIntyre‟s terms, a “virtuous / vicious” distinction of practice-institution arrangements in which 
either power dominates or cooperation dominates, and one or the other does so not simply at this 
point but at all subsequent points in time, is simply unable to discriminate sufficiently; any practical 
situation is always more nuanced than that.  
 
Second, and related to this, we should note that where the word “power” is used by MacIntyre it is 
nearly always with a negative connotation, as though power is inherently bad, or that it is bad 
because it inevitably leads to abuse of that power. But power and cooperation are not necessarily 
always in tension – power may, for example, be used in community to create cooperation by 
preserving the commons. Power may be used positively and those who exercise it may choose to 
limit or even exclude their own advantage. In addition, as Emerson has shown, “power resides 
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implicitly in the other‟s dependency” (1962, p.32) and there is always power and dependency on 
both sides of any relation. Hence, there are various “balancing operations” (ibid., p.35) through 
which any unbalanced power relation can move towards a more balanced position, including the 
powerful becoming more dependent upon the powerless. This suggests that power imbalances are 
always sources of tension resulting in dynamic processes that tend towards equilibrium, even 
though this may be over the long-run in some cases. The link with the requirement to develop a 
power-balanced structure within corporations of virtuous character is apparent. 
 
Third, we should note that productive activities (farming, fishing, architecture, construction) are 
cited by MacIntyre as legitimate examples of practices (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284). In other words, as 
what we might term “business” and MacIntyre would term “productive crafts”, there is nothing 
inherent in the actual activity of business that prevents an appropriate ascription of the term 
“practice”. 
 
MacIntyre‟s contention, however, and as we have noted above, is that in the capitalist forms of 
business organisation that have emerged the institution has, in effect, “won” over the practice – its 
justification is the pursuit of the goods of effectiveness – such that “much modern industrial 
productive and service work is organised so as to exclude the features distinctive of a practice” and 
in such a way that this type of activity is “at once alien and antagonistic to practices” (MacIntyre, 
1994, p.286). In other words, Beadle rightly summarises MacIntyre‟s position which is that modern 
economic orders do privilege the pursuit of external over internal goods, do not determine resource 
allocation to practices through a conscious and articulate process of collective decision-making, and 
thus do privilege power over cooperation to a degree which seems to preclude the ascription of the 
notion of a practice. 
 
I believe that I have both accepted this position and argued successfully against it in my use of the 
virtues-practice-institution schema. But my main point of contention is that all business activities, 
irrespective of their form of institutionalisation, must contain the vestiges of a practice and the 
virtues to some degree, for if they did not – that is, if the institution had “won” so completely that 
the virtues had suffered “something near total effacement” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.196) – then the 
institution would have, in effect, “killed” itself from the inside by failing to sustain the practice on 
which it itself is founded. In other words, while in capitalist forms of business organisation the 
practice is potentially and continually under threat from the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of 
the corporation, with its inherent tendency to avarice, it still exists.  
 
While this means that I am certainly borrowing, if not appropriating, MacIntyre and using his 
virtues-practice-institution schema from within a capitalist framework, it is a necessary implication 
that this creates a very severe critique of capitalism, but one which holds out the possibility of 
reformation rather than revolution
15. Beadle‟s argument, then, while doubtless a true representation 
of MacIntyre‟s position, does not set out to critique that position and so fails to find within it the 
possibility that something positive can be made of it. It is my contention that, on the contrary, by 
means of a positive critique of MacIntyre‟s work such as I have offered, something very positive 
indeed can be made of it. In relation to capitalist business organisations, and perhaps especially so, 
the notion of corporate character is both appropriate and needed. 
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1. The telos, or purpose or good, of human life is given the name eudaimonia by Aristotle. 
MacIntyre translates this as something like, “blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of 
being well and doing well, of a man‟s being well-favoured himself and in relation to the divine” 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.148). 
 
2. While pride was one of the traditional seven deadly sins, “proper pride” can be distinguished 
from “false pride” – see Lea & Webley (1997). The former is clearly a virtue. 
 
3. It is quite likely that many corporations, and organisations in general, will house more than one 
practice. For simplicity, henceforth I assume a single practice within any particular institution. 
 
4. There is an important question here as to whether or not I am introducing a new ontological 
category by ascribing the concept of character to corporations (or, indeed, to organisations in 
general), and if so whether this represents a category error. A means by which this might be 
considered would be via a discussion of corporate moral agency. Accepting that the attribution of 
personhood to corporations is problematic, French (1995) nonetheless argues that corporations can 
be considered as moral agents in their own right. If this were so, then it would not be difficult 
logically to extend the ascription of moral agency to include the notion of character and character 
development within the corporate form. Nor would this require the introduction of a new 
ontological category since the establishment of corporate moral agency would have already 
completed that task for us – a point that Velasquez, in his most recent article on this subject, (2003, 
p.538), acknowledges. 
 
We can, however, legitimately side-step this issue by drawing on the notion of metaphor. 
Goodpaster & Matthews (1982), for example, (an early article in the corporate moral agency debate 
which speaks of corporate moral agency by way of analogy or projection, but which does not seek 
to argue the ontological case), and Morgan (1997) support the notion that this is allowable. The 
point is well-made by Morgan: “When we say “the man is a lion”, we use the image of a lion to 
draw attention to the lionlike aspects of the man. The metaphor frames our understanding of the 
man in a distinctive yet partial way” (Morgan, 1997, p.4). Morgan, of course, uses this concept of 
metaphor throughout his book, in which he offers a series of metaphors for organisations – one of 
his metaphors, which links with the content of this paper, is to do with organisations as cultures. 
Martin makes the same point about culture as a metaphor: it is “a lens for examining organizational 
life” (2002, p.4). 
 
Drawing from this, all I wish to argue is that character, like culture, is another metaphor for 
organisations in general and corporations in particular. Like all metaphors it provides both a way of 
seeing and a way of not seeing (Morgan, 1997, p.5). My contention is simply that, when used in 
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conjunction with MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema as a fleshed-out concept distinct 
from organisational or corporate culture, it provides a particularly helpful way of seeing – a 
particularly helpful lens for examining corporate life. 
 
5. It was clearly Aristotle‟s view that character was a fixed and permanent disposition – see, for 
example, NE 1100b11-17, NE 1105a32, NE 1152a30-33 (Aristotle, 1955). 
 
6. The debate between Solomon (2003) and Harman (2003), both of whom draw extensively on 
Doris (2002), which concerns the conception of character and the evidence from social psychology 
that suggests that “people … do not have broad and stable dispositions corresponding to the sorts of 
character and personality traits we normally suppose that people have” (Harman, 2003, p.92), is, of 
course, potentially damaging to the argument here. If character in its traditional understanding does 
not exist at the individual level, then it is hardly worth trying to establish the usefulness of the 
concept at the organisational or corporate level. Solomon (2003), however, provides a robust 
defence of character. 
 
What is clear from this important debate is that the development of character, such that particular 
situations in which the individual finds him/herself are unlikely to have undue influence on 
behaviour, is by no means easy, and that circumstances can in some situations provide a better 
explanation for observed behaviour than the concept of character. It is also clear, however, that 
since character is developed through consistent practice, one act of dishonesty, for example, does 
not make a dishonest person. The concept of character survives its critique, therefore – albeit a 
more nuanced concept in which “situationism” is acknowledged but not privileged over a 
“globalist” understanding (Doris, 2002, pp.22-26 and passim). 
 
7. It may be of interest to note that I am by no means the first person to employ the term. 
Reidenbach & Robin (1991), for example, discuss a model of organisational moral development 
which has some resonances with Kohlberg‟s model of individual moral development (Kohlberg, 
1964). Having consistently used the terminology of “culture” throughout the article, however, the 
final sentence reads, “[f]urther study is sure to provide a clearer view of the process by which 
organizations change and develop their own moral characters” (op cit., p.284, emphasis added). 
This change of terminology is not explained and may well have been unintentional, but it is, 
nonetheless, echoed by other authors. One finds, for example, a reference to corporate character as 
far back as Selznick (1957). It is also occasionally used in a more casual way, for instance in a talk 
given by Sir Paul Judge (founder of the Judge Institute of Management Studies at Cambridge 
University), where he referred to a key responsibility of all Boards being “to decide and 
communicate their culture and character” (Judge, 2003, emphasis added). Even Gareth Morgan, in 
a chapter on organisations as cultures, slips on one occasion into usage of the word: “We see that 
the aggressive character of an organization is sustained by an implicit military mentality …” 
(Morgan, 1997, p.145, emphasis added).  
 
Swanda (1990) uses the term in connection with the financial notion of goodwill: “The value of the 
firm‟s moral character (along with other attributes), however, can result in a market value of the 
firm that is greater than the firm‟s net assets” (p. 752, emphasis added). He also, however, uses the 
term “moral climate” to mean much the same thing (ibid., p.752). Wilkins uses the term explicitly 
as an alternative to culture but only because “culture has been trivialised” (Wilkins, 1989, xi), and 
his use of the term differs little in substance from the normal conception of culture. He does, 
however, point to one helpful aspect that is associated with character, in contradistinction to culture: 
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that character is thought of in terms of development and growth rather than change (ibid., xii). 
Goffee & Jones‟ (1998) book entitled, “The character of a corporation” immediately reverts to 
culture in its sub-title: “How your company‟s culture can make or break your business”. Goodpaster 
& Matthews (1982, p.136), in a paper on corporate moral agency, comment that, “an organization 
reveals its character as surely as a person does” (emphasis added) and Klein (1988, p.56) draws on 
their work to talk of corporations potentially having “something analogous to character, which can 
be evaluated as virtuous or vicious”. None of these authors, however, seriously develops the 
concept of corporate character. Two authors who do explore the concept to some extent are 
Harrison (1972), whose paper is entitled “Understanding your organization‟s character”, and Deal 
& Kennedy (1988) who have a section of their book entitled “The Corporate Character”, but even in 
these examples there is no real development of the concept of character. In all these examples 
character and culture seem, if anything, to be used interchangeably. 
 
8. During the course of writing this article, the author witnessed, in an organisation with which he 
was involved, a particularly acute example of the character of the organisation changing as a result 
both of a significant change in the external environment and an equally significant change in 
influential people within the organisation. These changes led to a much greater focus on external 
goods to the detriment (as MacIntyre‟s schema indicates) of the practice. This seemed to be the 
cause of one particular middle manager being almost forced to work in a way that was so “out of 
character” that it was constantly surprising to see this individual able to retain some measure of 
integrity (used in the technical virtues sense employed here). A more understandable reaction might 
have been to resign or “go off on the sick”. Perhaps this rather distressing experience serves to 
illustrate the potentially powerful effect on individuals of a rather vicious organisational character. 
 
9. Such a separation may also help to explain the occurrence of dissonance between the culture and 
character of a corporation, when cultural claims to excellence are clearly not characteristic of the 
corporation. Many an employee, I suspect, fails to recognise their own corporation from the public 
relations, marketing and advertising material associated with it. Although the story of the couple 
who decided not to sell their house when they read the estate agent‟s description of it is surely 
apocryphal, it makes a similar point. 
 
10. Koehn‟s article is not primarily about corporate character but about the problems of applying 
Aristotelian virtue ethics in a corporate setting. She discusses four cases and shows how, in each 
case, an Aristotelian approach fails to provide a fully coherent explanation of the issue the case 
raises. Her challenge at the end is that “virtue ethics needs to be revised to take these problems into 
account” (Koehn, 1998, p.510). My contention is that the application of MacIntyre‟s virtues-
practice-institution schema, or “modern virtue ethics” as I have termed it, is such a revision. 
 
11. Aristotelian virtue ethics may handle this better than Koehn allows, given Aristotle‟s awareness 
of the effect of the community (the polis) on the individual‟s character. Thus a corrupt polis may 
lead to precisely the problems of systemic biases and power structures that Koehn says we should 
guard against, but Aristotle would have been aware of this. Here the polis of interest is the 
organisation. 
 
12. Here, again, Koehn may underestimate Aristotle who may well have considered thoughtlessness 
to be one of the varieties of akrasia – weak will. 
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13. This case also raises the intriguing possibility of a bad practice. Up to now, and within 
MacIntyre‟s schema, the practice has always been considered to be a “good” – a source of moral 
development for individuals, in which there is not only “a good product, but the craftsperson is 
perfected through and in her or his activity” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284). However, MacIntyre himself 
acknowledges that there may be practices which are evil (MacIntyre, 1985, pp.199-200), and we 
seem to have, in Speer‟s Ministry for armaments and war production, a practice that clearly 
produced a bad product. It might still have led, in some ways, to the moral development of 
individuals who worked there, but it must also have led to a much larger degree of moral depravity. 
Whether there can be, in general, the possibility of a bad practice housed by a good institution 
seems unlikely – could a virtuous institution really house a vicious practice? But a bad practice 
housed by a bad institution is surely exemplified by this case. 
 
14. This, however, raises again the difficulty of any individual corporation standing out from the 
crowd and being able to withstand the penalties that might be applied – the most obvious and 
instantaneous being the effect of a mark-down in share price by the financial institutions. I 
suggested in my original paper (Moore, 2002, p.30) that such virtuous corporations would thrive 
and offered some limited empirical evidence in support. This was in contrast to Dobson‟s more 
pessimistic analysis that the “virtuous firm”, if placed in a competitive market environment “would 
rapidly perish” (Dobson, 1996, p.227; Dobson, 1997, p.130). I think that I am now closer to 
Dobson‟s position, but with the important caveat that over time and recognising both the prudence 
(practical wisdom) required of managers and employees and the kinds of compromise that might be 
required, it may be possible to move towards an environment that is more conducive to the virtuous 
corporation than is currently the case. This may, of course, be optimistic but fits with my contention 
that it may be possible to borrow MacIntyre‟s virtues-practice-institution schema in such a way as 
to both create a severe critique of capitalism, and to hold out the possibility of reformation rather 
than revolution. The examples of Collins and Porras‟ visionary companies (Collins & Porras, 1998 
and see also the discussion in Moore, 2005, pp.239-240) may give rise to some empirical support 
for my optimism. 
 
15. It might be helpful to consider this in terms of Hendry‟s analysis of normative stakeholder 
theories, even though the terminology and conceptual framework of virtue ethics is very different 
from that of stakeholding. It seems clear that those who attempt to appropriate MacIntyre must, at 
the very least, recognise that, on one axis, they are working with “theories of the first kind” which 
ask questions such as: “How should an ideal just society structure economic or value-creating 
activity? What should it expect (and if appropriate legislate for) of the businesses that engage in this 
activity?” (Hendry, 2001, p.164), and, on the other axis, with theories that make demanding rather 
than intermediate or modest claims on stakeholder relationships. That is, they are working in the 
most extreme of Hendry‟s 3x3 matrix (ibid., p.167). But that MacIntyre can, I believe, be justifiably 
located on Hendry‟s framework at all suggests that it is possible to borrow at least a part of his 
work and use it in the constructive way suggested. 
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